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National Strategic Guidance: Do We Need a Standard Format?
EDWARD J. FILIBERTI

From Parameters, Autumn 1995, pp. 42-54.
In February 1944, a directive from the Combined Chiefs to General Dwight D. Eisenhower defined in a few brief
sentences the task for what became the largest amphibious invasion in the history of warfare:
Task. You will enter the continent of Europe and in conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake
operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces. The date for entering
the Continent is the month of May, 1944. After adequate channel ports have been secured, exploitation
will be directed towards securing an area that will facilitate both ground and air operations.[1]
The clarity, simplicity, and focus of the directive are remarkable. Military leaders would agree that such quality
guidance is essential to the successful prosecution of war. But what of the national strategic direction currently given
to our military and other departments and agencies? Is it not just as essential? How is this multi-agency strategic
guidance formulated and issued, and does it routinely convey the necessary information to successfully wage a war?
The potentially disastrous consequences of strategic failure demand an answer to these questions and an examination
of both the process and product of national strategic guidance formulation.
Much has been said and written about the need to define and balance the ends, ways, and means of war before entering
into a conflict. Yet, for all the importance placed upon a sound strategic concept, little has been written about the
essential elements of strategic guidance. This article examines the current system for formulating strategic guidance at
the national level and assesses the quality of that guidance. It then describes the essential elements of strategic
guidance. Finally, it proposes a format that can facilitate the formulation and communication of comprehensive
strategic guidance from the National Security Council to the executing federal departments and agencies.
The System
Strategic decisionmaking is an incredibly complex activity. Consider this description by former Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld:
Given the nature of our world, there are very few issues that are single department or single agency. For
example, the matter of selling grain to Poland is simultaneously a matter of interest for the Departments of
Agriculture, Treasury, State, and Labor, and for congressional relations, the general counsel, and probably
several other departments and agencies. So it is not possible to turn government over to the cabinet and
expect it to work. Coordination is needed. That is the responsibility of the White House. It falls essentially
on the NSC to serve as the coordinator for the principal participants in the national security and foreign
policy decision-making process, namely, State, Defense, CIA, ACDA, the Chiefs. But it also involves the
analysis of foreign defense policy with considerations relating to economic policy and domestic policy.[2]
Strategic guidance, formulated and issued at the highest levels of the US government, is developed within a system
that has specific participants, structures, and processes. Let us examine this system from two perspectives: that of the
staff agency and decisionmakers who devise and publish the guidance, and that of the organizations and leaders who
receive and implement the guidance.
The National Security Council System
Joint Publication O-2 states that "the President of the United States, advised by the National Security Council, is
responsible to the American people for national security unity of effort."[3] The National Security Council (NSC),

currently composed of the President, Vice President, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and other designated
cabinet and subcabinet officials, is the principal forum for formulating, approving, and disseminating strategic
guidance at the national level.[4] The NSC system includes the members of the council and the council staff, any
supporting interagency committees, and their defined procedures.
The system's active participants, procedures, policies, and document names and contents are determined by each
administration. They vary according to the nature of a crisis, the personalities involved, and the types of decisions
required.[5] Accordingly, the NSC system usually experiences major changes following the election of a new
President. Each new administration publishes a decision memorandum establishing and defining the NSC system and
outlining the basic structure of interagency decisionmaking. These memoranda are broad in scope and do not directly
address the actual form and content of strategic guidance nor the elements of that guidance.[6] Consequently, strategic
guidance issued by the NSC varies significantly from one administration to another and, within a given administration,
from crisis to crisis.
A critique of the nuances, differences, and scope of national policy formulation, approval, and dissemination peculiar
to each administration is beyond the scope of this article. In most recent administrations, however, policy formulation
has been increasingly managed by the NSC using interagency working groups or committees, some permanent and
others temporary, chaired by the National Security Advisor, Vice President, NSC principal, or appropriate AssistantSecretary-level official.[7]
Two general categories of strategic guidance emerge from this process: long-term strategic policy guidance and shortterm strategic decision directives.[8] The first type addresses long-term policy objectives with either a worldwide
perspective on an important issue or a long-term assessment of strategy in a specific region. It may also outline key
national interests, values, and objectives. This guidance may be published in the National Security Strategy (NSS) or
in memoranda written, coordinated, and distributed by the NSC staff, such as the guidance on the Strategic Defense
Initiative (NSDD 85) or Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (PDD 25). Generally, the guidance provides
continuity in foreign policy as it focuses, coordinates, and directs the various governmental organizations in applying
their respective instruments of national power (military, economic, diplomatic, and informational) to meet strategic
goals and objectives.
Emerging crises or short-notice events normally generate the second type of guidance. In response to a crisis, the NSC
or a special interagency planning group conducts time-sensitive analyses, determines appropriate actions, and issues
strategic guidance through approved decision directives. They may also approve proposed courses of action or on-theshelf contingency plans. These two types of guidance generally constitute the written directives that guide the
execution of US national security activities.
Within this system and over time, memoranda and directives assume a predictable form as an administration
formulates, coordinates, and publishes strategic guidance for similar activities. Because there are no formalized
decision criteria or standard formats for issuing strategic guidance, the thoroughness and quality of that guidance
varies substantially from document to document, from crisis to crisis, and from administration to administration.[9]
The resultant products reflect a process that lacks both a standardized structure and a set of relevant factors to be
considered and communicated before committing US elements of power.[10] What emerges is strategic guidance that
tends "to reflect a lowest common denominator of agency positions, or an incoherent compromise of partly or wholly
inconsistent views."[11] The guidance is usually so vague that powerful and sometimes recalcitrant bureaucratic
agencies are free to pursue their own independent and often conflicting policies.[12] On occasion, this has contributed
to disaster as strategies emerge from the interagency process with ill-defined ends, flawed concepts, or insufficient
means.[13]
The Executing Agencies
The NSC is the sole agency of the Executive Branch that can issue authoritative directives to all government
agencies.[14] The participating government agencies and departments respond to the NSC and, in turn, devise
implementing plans and direct their subordinate elements in the execution of their portions of the strategy. Incomplete
strategic guidance requires agencies to continually supplement their initial concepts or frequently respond to inquiries

from their field elements. In this manner, effective operations become dependent, in part, upon the internal
communications channels of the various agencies controlling and monitoring their subordinate elements outside of
Washington. Morton Halperin, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and member of the NSC staff,
describes how the process can be utterly ineffective:
Presidential decisions vary in specificity. They are often conveyed only in policy statements expressing a
sentiment or intention. The statements may indicate in general that certain kinds of action should be taken
but not say who should take them. Even if they do specify the actor, they seldom indicate when the action
should be taken or the details of how it should be done. In fact the instructions are so vague as to leave all
the actors free to continue behaving as they have in the past.[15]
Wide differences in agency internal procedures and communications capabilities complicate the dissemination of
strategic guidance and the augmentation of that guidance once their subordinate elements are deployed. The
Department of Defense, for example, has specific, well-defined internal procedures that address both deliberate
planning and the crisis-action process as well as detailed reporting requirements that facilitate control. The department
has standardized formats for issuing strategic military guidance to the Commanders in Chief of combatant commands.
Conversely, the Department of State, despite having a formal organization and specific message protocols, has no
established format for issuing guidance while directing diplomatic strategies in support of the national strategy.[16]
Other participating government and nongovernmental agencies may have neither formal organizational structures nor
standard communications procedures.[17] Consequently, DOD activities and compliance are much easier to direct and
monitor, while other agencies may or may not have adequate lines of authority, communications, or reporting systems.
Carnes Lord, a former NSC staff member, highlights this incongruence: "What has perhaps been most neglected is the
impact on national-level decisionmaking of the institutional fragmentation and lack of communication that
characterizes the national security bureaucracy outside of Washington."[18] This fragmentation is aggravated by
diverse agency cultures, philosophies, goals, organizational mismatches, political agendas, and competing policies that
all serve to impede voluntary cooperation. Thus, the synchronization of the multitude of agencies involved in the
execution of strategy depends necessarily on initial NSC guidance, the voluntary cooperation of disparate agencies, or
active NSC control through fragmented channels. The nature of this system places an even greater reliance on the
initial strategic guidance.
The NSC and subordinate agencies combine to create a disjointed system that depends on consensus, informal
relationships, and loose interagency coordination. All too frequently, the strategy reflects the process. Comprehensive
strategic guidance could offset the seemingly dysfunctional activities of the diverse players in the NSC system. Ideal
guidance would ensure that opportunities for enhancing our national security posture would not be missed through a
lack of strategic direction or by a requirement to compromise with other agencies all subject to the authority of the
NSC. The required unity of effort can be established only by the President; that effort necessarily depends upon
adequate and complete strategic guidance. Could a standardized form for disseminating guidance improve the process?
Requirement for a Standard Format
From 1981 through 1983, Carnes Lord was Director of International Communications and Information Policy on the
National Security Council Staff. In his words,
Little systematic analysis seems to have been devoted to the question of the character of presidential
decision documents on national security issues and their handling . . . . Generally speaking, there is little
evidence of consistency in the occasion, the purpose, the format, or the specificity of NSDDs . . . . It would
make sense to consider whether a wider range of documents ought to be available to the President for the
dissemination of decisions of different types and levels of specificity and classification, with more
rigorously defined formats to improve integration of presidential decisionmaking and facilitate
implementation.[19]
Formats have long been used in organizations to facilitate communications.[20] They provide a common framework
for the inclusion and transmittal of essential elements of information that apply to similar situations. Although formats
do not guarantee quality, they can ensure that guidance is comprehensive and facilitate the communication of task-

oriented information. Through the use of standard formats, composers and recipients know in advance the sequence in
which information is to be provided. This allows senders and receivers to simultaneously reason through deductive or,
depending on the sequence, inductive thought processes to define both the general situation and their specific task
requirements.[21] Standard formats also permit the deliberate sequencing of elements of information relative to their
importance.[22] The adoption of a standard format for strategic guidance by the NSC could assist in the formulation of
a more complete strategy and improve the comprehension of that strategy by the agencies required to carry out its
provisions.[23]
The end of the Cold War has brought about a less dangerous but perhaps more complex world. Major Ralph Peters
argues convincingly in his recent article "After the Revolution," that the United States and the military will be
increasingly involved in "filthy missions" that will require multi-agency involvement that will routinely exceed the
normal doctrinal roles and charters of all involved in the missions. These missions may include operations against
transnational criminal, terrorist, fundamentalist, and political organizations that do not conform to standard foreign
policy approaches.[24] The National Security Strategy of "Engagement and Enlargement" also has increased the
frequency of US involvement in such missions and placed a greater emphasis on the roles of nonmilitary government
agencies and nongovernmental agencies. The effective coordination of these agencies in unified, joint, and combined
operations across the spectrum of conflict is becoming more frequent and complex. It is also essential to achieving
national objectives. This strategic environment portends an even greater need for complete and comprehensive
strategic guidance and supports the adoption of a standard format.
The Elements of Strategic Guidance
General Albert C. Wedemeyer, principal author of the Army's strategic plan for World War II, spoke of an approach to
strategy that remains appropriate today:
Strategy properly conceived . . . seemed to me to require a transcendence of the narrowly military
perspectives that the term traditionally implied. Strategy required a systematic consideration and use of all
the so-called instruments of policy--political, economic, psychological, et cetera, as well as military--in
pursuing national objectives. Indeed, the nonmilitary factors deserved unequivocal priority over the
military, the latter to be employed only as a last resort.[25]
Strategic guidance should provide elements of information that the appropriate government departments and agencies
need if they are to take coordinated action and achieve the desired strategic objectives. These elements become
apparent from an analysis of the theoretical requirements for directing strategic action, from the considerations and
rationale for engagements outlined in the current National Security Strategy, and from an examination of the military's
joint doctrine information requirements.
Theoretical Elements of Strategic Guidance
In theory, a coherent and effective national security strategy would efficiently align and balance the strategic ends,
ways, and means in pursuit of our national interests and in consonance with our societal values.[26] The JCS defines
national security strategy as:
the art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power
(diplomatic, economic, military, informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. It
encompasses national defense, foreign relations, and economic relations and assistance; and [it] aims,
among other objectives, at providing a favorable foreign relations position, and a defense posture capable
of defeating hostile action.[27]
Logically then, guidance should address at the strategic level the ends, ways, and means for carrying out national
security strategy. When specifying the ways, strategic guidance should direct and synchronize the activities of the
appropriate agencies responsible for employing the diplomatic, economic, military, and informational elements of
power.
The selected strategy also should provide the rationale for the policy by explaining the "why" of the strategic concept.

The rationale for strategic engagements frequently allows the executing agencies to anticipate strategic direction by
defining and describing the overall intent of the engagement. In this regard, one analyst has pointed out, "Often, it is
not that the official is totally uninformed or that he completely misunderstands his orders. Rather, he has no way of
grasping the nuances behind decisions, no guidance as to why he is told to do what he has been told to do."[28]
Although critical, the "why" is only one part of the full range of information elements. As Wedemeyer observed,
generally a strategist must "answer the traditional questions of who, what, when, where, why, and how."[29]
Conceptually, these constitute the total elements of a strategic concept. They are inclusive. What remains is to focus
these elements as they pertain to strategic engagement.
Strategic Guidance Implications in the National Security Strategy
The February 1995 National Security Strategy directs that US forces will be prepared and deployed "to support US
diplomacy in responding to key dangers--those posed by weapons of mass destruction, regional aggression, and threats
to the stability of states."[30] The strategy defines the general principles regarding whether, when, and how forces will
be employed. More specifically,
The strategy specifies that decisions to use force are to be related to the degree of importance of the area or crisis
to our national interests (vital, important, and humanitarian), and it specifies that a decision to intervene
militarily will depend on the appropriateness of the use of armed forces and the degree of risk.
The strategy calls for weighing the costs and benefits of the use of military force and outlines a series of
rhetorical questions that should be answered before committing forces. These questions are designed to:
address the alternative use of nonmilitary means;
specify a clearly defined and achievable mission;
compare the risks and costs of intervention with the resources required to achieve the strategic goals;
assess the support of the American people and their elected representatives for a military intervention; and
specify the criteria for success or failure and define an exit strategy.
The strategy describes the general principles influencing how force will be used and the factors guiding
unilateral or multilateral action.[31]
These considerations generally provide the rationale for involvement in an area or crisis and answer certain aspects of
why a mission is being undertaken and certain aspects of how the selected strategy is to achieve the stated goals.
Analysis and resolution of ambiguities related to these considerations is essential information for the executing
agencies. Although the NSS procedures provide a reasonable foundation for establishing a common format for
transmitting presidential guidance and decisions, the information needs of the military's joint doctrine require a greater
degree of specificity than that anticipated by the NSC.
Joint Doctrine's Specified Strategic Guidance Requirements
Related to the theoretical and inferred elements of strategic guidance are the requirements outlined in current US
military doctrine. The Joint Staff identifies the essential strategic requirements of the National Command Authority in
JCS Pub 3-0. These requirements provide valuable insights into what guidance DOD requires to execute national
strategy. According to joint doctrine, the National Command Authority should ensure that:
(1) Military objectives to be achieved are defined, understood, and achievable.
(2) Active service forces are ready for combat and Reserve component forces are appropriately mobilized
and readied to join active forces.
(3) Intelligence systems and efforts focus on the operational area, including opposing nations and their
armed forces.
(4) Strategic direction is current and timely.

(5) Defense and other governmental agencies support the [joint force commander's] employment of forces.
(6) The CONUS base and other combatant commands are ready to provide needed support.
(7) Allies and coalition partners are available when appropriate.
(8) Forces and supplies deploy into the operational area in a timely manner to support the [joint force
commander's] concept of operation.[32]
These eight essential elements of joint warfighting requirements provide a good starting point for determining what
guidance the National Security Council should provide to government departments and agencies. Although many of
the elements pertain to other than DOD activities, the above list does not include the requirements of all involved
agencies. Additionally, the NSC is not obligated, nor has it felt compelled, to conform to the doctrine of its
subordinate Defense Department. Thus, there is a need for a standard format that subsumes the requirements of the
Defense Department and other participating agencies and routinely provides adequate and comprehensive guidance.
The foregoing theoretical requirements, combined with strategic engagement principles and military doctrinal needs,
provide the basis for establishing a format for strategic guidance. What remains is to determine how best to package
the essential elements of information in a format acceptable to the NSC and federal departments and agencies. The
format should facilitate the formulation of comprehensive strategic guidance for interagency coordination of crisis
response or long-range planning activities.
Proposed Format for Strategic Guidance
It is beyond the scope of this article to provide an inclusive format that could apply to all government and
nongovernmental organizations for every crisis or engagement. Not every decision directive must address in detail all
eight elements of the format proposed below, but none of the eight categories should be ignored in providing strategic
guidance. The nature of the engagement, the amount of time for analysis, and the degree of prior planning may alter
significantly the amount of detail required in guidance or directives. The description that follows does provide,
however, representative types of the information required. Therefore, the types of information described in the
following paragraphs should be provided in the preparation phase of an engagement or as soon as possible after an
engagement has begun.
1. Strategic Context. At a minimum, this section should explain why an engagement is being considered. It should
highlight the event, opportunity, or problem that led to the strategic action and why it is sufficiently important for the
United States to be engaged. It should contain an assessment that provides an overview of the entire strategic situation
while addressing the major influences on US alternatives. Content of this section could include US national interests
and values at stake, the nature and intensity of the threat, conflicting or competing national interests in other regions,
and an overview of the expected responses of other major actors who may have significant interests in the region or
crisis.
2. Engagement Objectives. This section would address primarily what the engagement is to accomplish. It would
specify the selected strategic objectives and should logically follow from the strategic context discussion. It also should
portray a clear cause-and-effect relationship between the objectives selected and the underlying rationale for
engagement. For example, an objective presented as an "end state" condition would describe the social, political,
economic, military, and geographical status of the nations to be affected by the engagement. If applicable, this section
could include a hierarchical set of end states reflecting optimal to satisfactory completion conditions and an assessment
of their corresponding risks. Desired or proposed end states should resolve the problems or realize the opportunities
defined in the section on Strategic Context.
3. Engagement Concept. This section would address when, where, and how the engagement is to occur and outline the
concept for achieving the specified objectives. It would record the NSC's concept of how the prescribed objectives are
to be attained. This concept should synchronize all agencies in time and space, coordinating their efforts, sequencing
phases, and establishing priorities. When appropriate, a subparagraph for each agency, describing its assigned tasks or
its unique role in achieving the overall strategic objectives, should be included. This section might also include
detailed instructions to the participating departments and agencies. For example, it might address to the military such
issues as mobilization, increased readiness, and pre-hostility force deployments; it might address to intelligence

agencies a discussion of space-based intelligence systems, in-country human intelligence sources, and area and
opposing force analyses; for the Department of State it might address solidifying the support of allies and coalition
partners, securing basing or overflight rights, or assessing the positions of other foreign nations. The foregoing are
only representative of the range and variety of information required when developing the concept for interagency
responses to presidential guidance or directive.
4. Marshalling and Sustaining the National Will. This section would focus on the domestic political environment. It
should outline the concept for gaining and maintaining public support for the strategy. This portion could assign
supporting public affairs tasks to governmental agencies consistent with the strategic concept. It also could indicate
those aspects of the engagement that are not releasable to the public and establish the time or event that would trigger
release of certain specified information. Finally, this section should assess the anticipated public response to likely or
expected incidents associated with the execution of the strategic concept.
5. Command and Control and Organizational Hierarchy. This section would establish unity of effort for interagency
planning and support at the national and international levels. It would establish lines of authority, responsibility, and
reporting. It would designate the lead agency for the various phases of the strategic concept and the event or time that
determines when responsibility as lead agency transfers.
6. Constraints and Special Authorizations. This section could specify any limitations on normal agency prerogatives
and provide the rationale for their imposition. The rationale should explain in terms of cause and effect the relationship
of the prevented activity to the predicted undesirable outcome. It also should define operations that are precluded and
specify the fundamentals for establishing rules of engagement. This portion of the guidance would establish any
special authority required by a department, agency, or individual diplomat and would specify authority for targeting the
opposing nation's national command authority, country infrastructure, or other special targets as appropriate. Finally, it
would specify those activities for which planning and coordination have been delegated and others for which decision
authority would be withheld at the NSC level.
7. Strategy Review Criteria. This section would establish specific and tangible criteria that would initiate a
reassessment of the strategic engagement. It would set timelines and milestones for such a review, possibly indicating
degrees of success or failure. This part also would specify measures of effectiveness to be used in monitoring and
assessing the performance of the participating agencies. Finally, it would articulate exit criteria short of mission
accomplishment in terms of the overall cost, declining public support, competing national interests, or possible
emerging alternative threats to the national security.
8. Strategic Contingency Options. This section would address branches and sequels for the central strategic concept.
Branches are activities or phases that pose a high risk or have a high degree of uncertainty that can be expected and
planned for. They outline alternative strategies that might be pursued based upon changed circumstances. Sequels are
potential follow-on strategies that take into account the possibilities of success, failure, or disengagement without a
decision. Branches and sequels are necessarily related to the strategy review criteria. At a minimum, this section would
provide the exit strategy for the engagement.
The above format was used during a Strategic Crises Exercise conducted at the Army War College in March 1995. It
proved to be remarkably flexible and effective in use during the 10-day computer-based exercise. War College
students who used the format expanded the specific elements listed here and focused the exercise guidance to address a
broad range of world crises. The scenario of the exercise included two near-simultaneous major regional contingencies
in North Africa and the Middle East, civil war in southern Africa, commerce raiding in the South Pacific, international
disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in Latin America, and peacekeeping and peacemaking operations in Eastern
Europe. The format proved adaptable and facilitated the formulation and communication of strategic guidance for each
of the various contingencies throughout the exercise.[33]
Conclusions
As the United States breaks new ground in "filthy missions" in support of a ubiquitous global strategy of engagement
and enlargement, the clarity of our purpose, the unity of our effort, and the effective employment of our scarce
resources will become paramount concerns of senior leaders. Effective strategic guidance is the sine qua non of

workable foreign and defense policies. The consequences of failure at the strategic level are severe; Field Marshal
Keitel pointed out at the Nuremberg trials that "a mistake in strategy can only be made good in the next war."[34]
The current ad hoc system of formulating strategic guidance is clearly not conducive to producing strategies
appropriate to our foreign policy initiatives or responses to crises. American history is replete with tragic examples:
Korea, the Bay of Pigs, Vietnam, Beirut, Somalia. If we are to limit future strategic blunders, we need to rethink how
we formulate, disseminate, and monitor the execution of national military strategy. Policymakers who place Americans
in peril without a clear understanding of the strategic objectives--or what is necessary to attain those objectives--risk
increasing the list of foreign policy failures. Lives will be sacrificed and too-soon forgotten as the institutional memory
becomes absorbed either in the glory that envelops success or in the partisan political analyses of a failure.
Standardizing the format for preparing and communicating strategic guidance will not guarantee success. What it can
do is provide a reasonably complete framework to help national leaders consider all relevant aspects of a proposed
strategic engagement. Such a format also will facilitate the communication of those strategies to the agencies that must
carry them out. Whether this format or an alternative is adopted, the policymaking apparatus must continue to refine
its strategic planning system. When the United States acts, it should do so with clarity of purpose and unity of effort.
Our country and its armed services deserve no less.
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